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I. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF CASE 
Jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court pursuant to §§ 78-2-
2(3)(a) and (5) U.C.A. (1953 as amended 1988) and Rules 42 and 
48(d) R. Utah S. Ct. The case was originally transferred to the Court 
of Appeals pursuant to § 78-2a-3(2)(j) U.C.A. (1953 as amended 
1988). 
This is an appeal from a decision of the Utah Court of Appeals 
in a real property dispute which was originally tried in the District 
Court of Summit County. 
CASE NO. 890139 
Priority No. 13 
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II . 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Was Plaintiffs' "tax title" protected from challenge by the 
Defendants after four years by the statute of limitations prescribed 
in § 78-12-5.1 (U.C.A), even if the tax deeds were ambiguous? 
2. Plaintiffs and their predecessors adversely possessed the 
home and yard which is the subject of this action and paid all taxes 
assessed from 1910 to 1931. Title vested after seven years pursuant 
to 78-12-12.1 (U.C.A.) and cannot be attacked 70 years later. 
3. Plaintiffs' "root of title" to this property is at least 70 years 
old and is coupled with their exclusive possession since 1910. Their 
ownership and title is protected from challenge by the Utah 
Marketable Title Act, § 57-9-1 et seq. (U.C.A., 1953). 
4. If Plaintiffs did not have title to the yard on which their 
house was located for 70 years, did they maintain a prescriptive 
right to maintain their home and yard in that location? 
5. Is Park City liable for the destruction of Plaintiffs' home for 
authorizing a third party to destroy it, and was the claim for 
damages timely filed? 
III . 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
The following statutes are determinative and are appended to 
this brief: 
1. Section 2655, Compiled Laws of Utah (1907). 
2. Section 2425, Compiled Laws of Utah (1907) 
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3. Section 80-5-12, Utah Code Annotated (1943) 
4. Section 78-12-5.2, Utah Code Annotated (1953) 
5. Section 57-9-1 et seq., Utah Code Annotated (1953) 
6. Section 63-30-13, Utah Code Annotated (1953) 
7. Section 78-12-5.1, Utah Code Annotated (1953) 
8. Section 78-12-5.3, Utah Code Annotated (1953) 
9. Section 78-12-7, Utah Code Annotated (1953) 
10. Section 57-1-13, Utah Code Annotated (1953) 
IV. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
This is an action to quiet title to a home and yard in Park City 
and for the destruction of that home by Park City to build a new 
road. The Plaintiffs are all of the heirs of William and Charles Rolfe 
who were Plaintiffs' grandfather and father, respectively. 
The Plaintiffs' family commenced residing in this home in 
approximately 1910. None of the Defendants in any way ever 
occupied or maintained possession of the property. 
Trial was held on May 6 and 7, 1987. Judgment was entered 
determining that while both the Plaintiffs' and Defendants' chains of 
title were flawed, the State of Utah's title was superior. The trial 
court also dismissed Plaintiffs' claims to title by adverse possession 
and the Marketable Record Title Act. 
Plaintiffs appealed to the Utah Supreme Court which 
transferred the case to the Court of Appeals. That Court ruled in its 
opinion dated March 13, 1989 that Plaintiffs did not hold title by 
adverse possession, the tax deeds and statute of limitations were 
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inapplicable and there was no prescriptive easement applicable to 
this action. The opinion did not address the application of the 
Marketable Record Title Act or Plaintiffs' claim of damages for the 
destruction of their home, other than to note those issues had been 
raised on appeal. 
V. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This is an action which was brought to secure title to the 
Plaintiffs' family home in Park City. The house and yard were 
located on what is now the "new" access road to Deer Valley in the 
depot area. The property is located next to the yard and home which 
was the subject matter of this Court's decision in Park West Village, 
Inc. v. Avise, 714 P.2d 1137 (Utah, 1986). 
The Plaintiffs are all of the heirs of the family that commenced 
residing in this home in approximately 1910 (T. p. 40). At that time 
William Rolfe and his wife moved into the home and two generations 
of the Rolfe family were raised there. The family occupied the 
property continuously until about 1964 (T. p. 44); visited the 
property on a regular basis thereafter (T. p. 65); and, were repairing 
the home when it was demolished between August 4th and 
September 7, 1981 to build an access road for Deer Valley Resort 
(C.A. Opinion p. 2). 
The home was a two-bedroom house with a front room, 
kitchen, cellar, and "L-shaped" porch (T. p. 28). The yard was fenced 
and terraced with a retaining wall on the back and a garden on top 
(T. p. 26, Ex. 2). The yard contained an apple tree and was always 
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enclosed by a fence (T. p. 43) and, in fact, the fence existed as of the 
date of trial (T. p.77). 
1. Possession and Use of the Home and Property 
It is important to emphasize that at no time prior to the 
commencement of this suit have any of the Defendants or their 
predecessors, in any manner whatsoever, ever used or been in 
possession of this property. The Plaintiffs and their family, however, 
maintained actual occupancy or use for at least the last 70 years. 
William Rolfe resided in this home from at least 1910 until his 
death in 1939 (T. p.40). After that his widow continued to live at the 
home until 1946. She died in 1949 (T. p.40). After 1949 the 
Plaintiffs' father, Charles Rolfe, rented the house to "the Evans girls" 
until approximately 1964 (T. pp. 44-65). The Plaintiffs continued to 
visit and go to the property at least once a year from them on (T. 
p.65). Charles Rolfe died in 1966 and the Plaintiffs' mother, Ethel 
Rolfe, died in 1981 (T. p. 69). 
In addition to the foregoing acts of possession and ownership, 
both the Plaintiffs and Park City recognized Plaintiffs' ownership of 
the property. In 1978 Park City sent Ethel Rolfe a letter requesting 
her to fix up and repair the house in question (T. p. 42, Ex. 16). 
There is no explanation given or testimony as to why Park City could, 
at the time of trial, claim they owned the house and had since 1969 
yet ask Mrs. Rolfe, as owner, to repair it in 1978. There was another 
request by the Park City Building Inspector which had been sent to 
Mrs. Rolfe but which had been lost (T. p. 53). The Plaintiffs informed 
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Park City that they were going to repair the house (T. p. 59, Ex. 17), 
and that the residence was to be rehabilitated (T. pp. 53, 54). 
In the late 1970s, one of the Plaintiffs and her family 
commenced the actual rehabilitation of the premises (T. pp. 53-55). 
This included repairing the roof; obtaining engineering and legal 
opinions relative to the property; electrical work; contacting the Park 
City Building Inspector; and putting a new door on the property (T. 
pp. 56-59). An actual log of some of this activity was maintained by 
Mrs. Anderson showing continual work on their property (T. Ex. 41). 
No one, up to the time the house was demolished in 1981, ever 
challenged or refuted Plaintiffs' ownership or right of use of this 
property. None of the Defendants nor any of their predecessors ever 
made any claim of right to possess or use the Rolfe home prior to 
these proceedings. 
2. Payment of Taxes on the Subject Property 
As was the case in Park West Village v. Avise, 714 P.2d 1137 
(Utah, 1986), there is some confusion about the assessment of real 
property taxes in Summit County in the early part of this century. 
There appeared to be a practice of assessing real property taxes to 
more than one party, or assessing the improvements to one party 
and the underlying real property to another, but treating all 
assessments or liens as delinquent, real property taxes. 
However, there is no dispute that this dichotomy of real 
property assessment did not occur in this instance until the Plaintiffs 
had been in actual, physical possession of this property for over 31 
years. 
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The Court of Appeals at page 3 of their Opinion found: 
"There was no evidence that anyone other 
than William Rolfe paid taxes on the property 
until 1931. From 1931 to 1953 the real 
property was assessed as part of Silver King 
Coalition Mines. From 1954 to 1969 real 
property taxes were assessed to and paid by 
United Park City Mines." 
In addition to the foregoing findings, the following facts are 
germane to the payment of taxes. 
After 1970 the real property was not assessed because it 
formed a portion of numerous parcels of property which had been 
given by United Park City Mines to Park City Corporation. The Avise 
property was also one of those parcels. The Rolfes themselves paid 
all taxes assessed to them (T. p. 46), and since the death of Mrs. Rolfe 
in 1981, Merle Anderson, one of the Plaintiffs, paid the taxes (T. pp. 
46, 59-70). At no time did Summit County or any other party make 
any demand for additional taxes or state taxes were due on the 
property (T. p. 86). In 1957 the Plaintiffs' father made an inquiry to 
ascertain if there were any delinquent taxes due on the property and 
the Summit County Treasurer responded in a letter (T. pp. 47, 48, Ex. 
13) as follows: 
"Dear Mr. Rolfe: 
I checked over the records on the tax 
situation of your father's place in Park City 
and found that in 1938 a Quit-Claim Deed was 
issued by the County to your father for 
$33.00. The receipt and everything was made 
out to William Rolfe, Sr. so I have no way of 
knowing who paid that money. From 1940 
until 1952 the taxes have been taken care of 
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by widow's abatement by the County 
Commission. In the year 1955 you paid the 
taxes of $8.06, in 1956 you paid the taxes in 
the amount of $7.33. I hope this is the 
information you want, but if I can help you in 
any way, please, let me know more. 
Sincerely, 
Reid Pace 
Summit County Treasurer" 
(Addendum 5) 
3. Documents of Title 
A. Plaintiffs' Chain of Title. 
In addition to the claim of uninterrupted use and possession of 
the property coupled with the payment of taxes (at least from 1910 
until 1931), Plaintiffs assert title through a chain of documents: 
1. Tax Deed (which is delineated "quit-claim deed") from 
Summit County to William Rolph (sic) dated June 10, 1914 for $28.60 
for "improvements east U.C. track, Park City, Utah". The Deed states 
that it is made from title secured from a tax sale in the year 1909 
and by an auditor's deed to Summit County dated May 1, 1914 and 
in accordance with Section 2655, Compiled Laws of Utah, 1907 
(Addendum 1). 
2. Tax Deed from Summit County to William Rolfe dated June 
21, 1917 for $1.00 for "that certain framed dwelling house by 
lumber house in Park City, Summit County, Utah", assessed to 
William Rolfe in the year 1912. That Deed was also issued under 
authority of Section 2655, Laws of Utah 1907 as amended by Chapter 
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114 and 115, Laws of Utah 1911 and pursuant to an Order of the 
Board of County Commissioners of Summit County (Addendum 2). 
3. Letter from the Summit County Treasurer to Charles Rolfe 
dated May 16, 1957 stating that he had found a 1938 Quit-Claim 
Deed issued by Summit County to William Rolfe. The letter also 
stated that from 1940 to 1954, taxes were taken care of by widow's 
abatement and that Charles Rolfe had paid taxes in 1955 and 1956 
(Addendum 3). 
4. Tax Deed from Summit County to Charles Rolfe dated June 
13, 1963 for the "following described real estate in Summit County 
Utah: house and lumberyard. "This conveyance is made in 
consideration of payment by the Grantee of the sum of $12.53 
delinquent taxes, penalties, interest and costs, constituting a charges 
against said real estate for the year 1958 in the sum of $7.81 
(Addendum 4). 
B. Defendants9 Chain of Title. 
The Defendants claim title to the property through a series of 
documents, but at no time claim to have had the physical use or 
possession of the property. Three of their documents lack a legal 
description of the real property to which they apply (C.A. Opinion, p. 
3). The documents are as follows: 
1. Patent containing this property and others to George Snyder 
on April 5, 1882. 
2. Deed from George Snyder to Park City Smelting Company 
dated November 14, 1883. 
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3. Deed from Park City Smelting Company to Lewis Withey and 
Clay Holister dated September 21, 1912. This Deed did not contain a 
"legal description" of the property buy conveyed "all of the real 
property or rights or interest in real property belonging to the Park 
City Smelting Company and situated in the County of Summit Utah." 
4. Deed from the Estate of Lewis Withey to Silver King 
Coalition Mine Company dated November 5, 1926. This Deed did not 
contained a description of the property but conveyed "all the estate, 
right, title, interest, property, claim and demand whatsoever of the 
said Lewis Withey . . ." 
5. A Trustee's Deed from Clay Holister to Silver King Coalition 
Mine dated February 18, 1927. This Deed had no description of the 
property but described it as "all other real property or rights or 
interest in real property . . . belonging to Park City Smelting 
Company, and situated in the County of Summit, State of Utah." 
[There is no explanation or evidence of a conveyance of any of the 
subject property into a trust or the terms of said trust.] 
In addition to lacking a legal description of the subject 
property in documents 3 through 5, they are all conveyances in the 
form of a quit-claim deed as defined by Section 57-1-13 U.C.A. and 
there are no warranties or conveyances of after-acquired title. 
6. Deed from Silver King Coalition Mines Company to United 
Park City Mines Company dated May 8, 1953. 
7. Deed from United Park City Mines Company to Park City 
dated April 2, 1969. 
8. Deed from Park City to the State of Utah dated June 7, 1982. 
1 1 
Hie foregoing summan - r ^~ conveyances under which l he 
Suit ill 11|,ii ; luunu on page 3 of the Court of Appeals 
Opinion (Addendum 
4. Pacific Avenue 
August, 1981, Park \ u, ^suu a ,> 
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Pacific" (Ex. 3S, Addendum (\i ; address • : T,L Ph<n< * i 
was ill '" Pacific Avenue ' ^- lf* :) . l * permit .IIM< ! 4<J' I 
attachment which stated remo\r | 
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A demolished. 
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N the destruction ot „i 
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I l i • iv. Construction demolish the house pursuant i-.t 
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This discrepancy was never addressed at trial nor was any 
justification as to the demolition of Plaintiffs' home. 
Merle Anderson, besides being one of the owners of this home, 
has personal experience in remodeling and repairing "a number of 
homes" because she and her husband were in the property 
management business at the time of trial. She testified, without 
objection, that the replacement costs of the structure would exceed 
$20,000.00 (T. p. 63). No appraisals could have been performed on 
the structure since it was surreptitiously destroyed (T. p. 64), and it 
wasn't until about a month later, on Labor Day, 1981, that Plaintiffs 
became aware of the destruction (T. p. 73). The lower court took 
judicial notice that Labor Day, 1981 was September 7, 1981. 
5. Claim for Damages 
A claim for damages for the destruction of the home was sent 
to Park City on August 30, 1982 (Ex. 18) within one year of the time 
the Plaintiffs discovered the destruction. A denial of that claim was 
sent to the Plaintiffs by the Park City Attorney September 20, 1982 
(Ex. 19). The trial court confused these dates and found the claim 
was submitted on September 20, 1982 (R. p. 381, F.F. # 16) 
(Addendum 9). 
6. Miscellaneous 
The trial court in its Findings of Fact (R. p. 380, FF 3, 4) found 
that the Plaintiffs' grandfather had worked for Silver King Coalition 
Mines; were permitted to construct a house on the property and that 
such was common practice for "this company" (R. p. 380, F.F. # 4) 
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There is absolutely no evidence in the records to support these 
findings. 
The house is described in a deed in McPollin to McCaroll dated 
1906 (C.A. Opinion p. 2). Mr. Rolfe's possession commenced at least 
by 1910 according to the testimony of his daughter (T. p. 40). This 
was years before Silver King Coalition ever existed as an entity (T. p. 
176), and 20 years before they even received a deed under which 
the Defendants claim an interest (1926 Deed from Withey Estate to 
Silver King). Merle Anderson testified that neither her father or 
grandfather ever worked for Silver King (T. p. 44). The Defendants' 
witness, who had only worked for the later corporation, United Park 
City Mines from 1953, stated he knew of only one instance in Deer 
Valley where United Park City Mines, not Silver King Coalition, 
allowed someone to stay on their property (T. p. 173). He did not 
know if William Rolfe was ever employed by any of the companies 
comprising Defendants' parent chain (T. p. 176) and he stated that he 
did not have any knowledge that Charles Rolfe ever worked for any 
of these companies (T. p. 177). He further added that he had "no real 
personal knowledge of early history in that regard" (T. p. 174). This 
apparent "consent" is completely fictional and without support in the 
record. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. Plaintiffs' title which relies on written deeds originates from 
"tax deeds" from Summit County, some of which are over 70 years 
old. At the time the deeds were executed, the Plaintiffs' 
predecessors were not the owners obligated to pay real estate taxes, 
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they were purchasers. The statute of limitations in § 78-12-5.1 
U.C.A. required Defendants to assert their claim in four years. They 
waited 70 years and their challenge to those deeds is barred. 
2. It is undisputed that between at least 1910 and 1931 the 
Plaintiffs' grandparents open and notoriously occupied their home 
and paid all taxes assessed. Title vested by adverse possession after 
1917 and cannot be challenged now (§ 78-12-7 and 12, U.C.A. 
(1953)). 
3. Plaintiffs' title is derived from a written conveyance(s) in 
1914 or 1917. They had "color of title" which, coupled with their 
exclusive possession of the property for more than forty years, 
insulates their title from challenge pursuant to the Utah Marketable 
Title Act, § 57-9-1 et seq. 
4. If Plaintiffs don't have vested title, they had a prescriptive 
use for their house and yard from 70 years of use and ownership. 
5. Park City is liable for negligently authorizing the destruction 
of the Plaintiffs' house. A claim was not necessary but was timely 




The Statute Of Limitations In Section 
78-12-5.1 U.C.A. Bars A Collateral Attack 
On A "Tax Title'5 After Four Years. 
The Rolfe family commenced living in this home in about 1910. 
From 1910 to 1931, "there was no evidence that anyone other than 
William Rolfe paid taxes on the property" (C.A. Opinion, p. 3). The 
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trial court and Court of Appeals found that, while imperfect, the 
Defendants' predecessors [Park City Smelting, (1883-1912); Louis 
Withey and Clay Holister (1912-1926, '27); Silver King Coalition 
Mines (1927-1931+)] (C.A. Opinion, p. 3) were the "owners" obligated 
to pay all real property taxes assessed against the property as set 
forth in Section 2651 Compiled Laws of Utah 1907. At a tax sale in 
1914 William Rolfe purchased the property and home. The tax deed 
(Addendum 1) recites that Summit County has received title to this 
property from a tax sale in 1909 (one year before Mr. Rolfe moved 
in) and an auditor's deed dated May 1, 1914 and in accordance 
with Section 2655, Compiled Laws of Utah 1907. The 
statutory authority for the conveyance of this property to Mr. Rolfe 
is located in Chapter 49 entitled "Sale of Real Estate for Taxes." 
Section 2655 provides 
"Real Estate Deed To County To Be Sold Aj 
Auction. Whenever a county has received a 
tax deed for any real estate sold for 
delinquent taxes, the Board of County 
Commissioners shall . . . offer for sale at the 
front door of the County Courthouse, at the 
time specified in the notice, all such real 
property not heretofore sold or redeemed 
provided, that in cases where the description 
of such real estate is so defective as to convey 
no title, such real estate shall not be offered." 
See also Section 2425, Compiled Laws of Utah, 1907 and § 80-5-12 
U.C.A. (1943). 
The statutory basis under which William Rolfe purchased this 
home provides and allows only for the sale of real property to pay 
delinquent taxes. There is no provision nor authority to sell personal 
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property and it is submitted that the description of the property as 
"improvement East U.C. track, Park City" was utilized to identify the 
property in the same manner as a street address might be utilized 
and was not intended to change the conveyance from one of real 
property after a tax sale to one of personal property. 
Even assuming the tax deed in 1914 was not valid, there is no 
evidence of any action which would have invalidated the title 
received by Summit County from the auditor's deed dated May 1, 
1914 and referred to in Addendum 1. In 1917 a second tax deed 
from Summit County to William Rolfe was executed (Addendum 2). 
Once again, for purposes of identification, the property is described 
as a certain framed dwelling house by lumber yard assessed to 
William Rolfe in the year 1912. Once again, this deed recites 
"This deed is made under authority of Section 
2655 Compiled Laws of Utah as amended by 
Chapter 114 and 115, Laws of Utah, 1911 and 
in pursuance of an Order of the Board of 
County Commissioners of said County made on 
the 5th day of June, A.D. 1917." 
Section 78-12-5.3 defines the acquisition of "tax title" as used 
in the Statute of Limitations found in Section 78-12-5.2 (U.C.A. 1953) 
as 
". . . means any title to real property, whether 
valid or not (emphasis added) which has been 
derived through or is dependent upon any 
sale, conveyance, or transfer of property in 
the course of a statutory proceeding for the 
liquidation of any tax levied against the 
property whereby the property is relieved 
from a tax lien." 
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Section 78-12-5.2 provides: 
"No action or defense for the recovery or 
possession of real property or to quiet title or 
determine the ownership thereof shall be 
commenced or interposed against the holder 
of a tax title after the expiration of four years 
from the date of the sale, conveyance or 
transfer of such tax title to any county, or 
directly to any other purchase thereof at any 
public or private sale . . ." 
It is uncontested that no other party to this action except 
Plaintiffs and their predecessors ever occupied, used, or openly 
asserted any ownership prior to the commencement of these 
proceedings. 
In the event the tax title acquired by William Rolfe was subject 
to challenge there was a third tax deed conveyed from Summit 
County to him in 1938. Charles Rolfe, in an attempt to ascertain that 
all the real property taxes that were due had been paid on the family 
home inquired of the Summit County Treasurer in 1957. The 
Treasurer responded by letter (Addendum 5) that another Quit-
Claim Deed had been executed from Summit County to William Rolfe 
in 1938 (this deed was not located). The letter goes on to say that 
from 1940 until 1954 taxes on his "father's place in Park City" were 
taken care of by widow's abatement and that Mr. Rolfe had paid the 
taxes for William Rolfe in 1955 and 1956. In 1963 Summit County 
executed a fourth "Tax Deed" to Plaintiffs' predecessor Charles Rolfe 
for "real estate in Summit County" (Addendum 4). 
The holding of the Trial Court as affirmed by the Court of 
Appeals, established that the Plaintiffs were never the "owners" of 
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the property and, in fact, that is precisely the reason for the adverse 
ruling. The holding stated the Rolfes were never record title holders 
except as to that title originating from the tax deeds. The Court of 
Appeals misapplied this Court's findings in Dillman v. Foster, 656 
P.2d 974 (Utah, 1982) because in this instance, under the Trial 
Court's findings, Rolfes had no duty to pay real estate taxes because 
they were not the owners. Further, the Court of Appeals' statement 
that one cannot assert the statutes of limitations found in Section 78-
12-5.1 unless they have both a tax deed and independent title is 
simply a misapplication of the rule prescribed in Dillman. 
The application of the statute of limitations as it relates to this 
case was treated in the case of Frederiksen v. La Fleur, 632 P.2d 827 
(Utah, 1981) in which this Court stated that a purchaser of property 
under a tax deed (whether or not they had title) could invoke the 
provisions of Section 78-12-5.1, U.C.A. 1953 against the record 
owner, even if they could not otherwise satisfy the adverse 
possession requirements and even though the tax title was invalid. 
In that action, the only claim that the purchaser had was a tax deed 
from an admittedly defective tax sale and any attack on that title 
was barred by the "special statute of limitation regardless of either 
the invalidity of their tax title or their inability to establish an 
affirmative claim to title apart from their tax title" (p. 831). 
Similarly, none of the Defendants were ever in actual occupancy or 
possession of the property. 
The obvious truth of this situation is that Plaintiffs and their 
predecessors lived and treated this property as their own for almost 
70 years and it was not until Defendants wished to build a road in 
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1980 that anyone either challenged or contested their ownership. 
This Court, in Dillman v. Foster, Supra at 978, reiterated the validity 
of the analysis in Frederiksen and stated: 
"The Frederiksen case points out that it was to 
give increased stability to tax titles that in 
1951 the Utah Legislature enacted Section 78-
12-5.1 through 5.3 which provide a special 
statute of limitations applicable to tax titles. 
If the conditions of the statutes are met, the 
tax title cannot be challenged after four years 
following its purchase, regardless of its 
original validity. 
II. 
Title Vested In Plaintiffs By 1917 By 
Adverse Possession And Cannot Be 
Challenged 70 Years Later 
Plaintiffs submit that this Court's decision in Park West Village 
v. Avise, 714 P2d. 1137 (Utah, 1986) is "on all fours" with this action 
and requires that title be quieted in the Plaintiffs pursuant to the 
Adverse Possession Statute 78-12-7.1 U.C.A. (1953) and since title 
vested in William Rolfe in 1917 the attack on Plaintiffs' title is now 
barred by this Statute. 
The following unrefuted facts as to the vesting of Plaintiffs' 
title are submitted for review. 
1. There is no dispute that William Rolfe and his family lived 
in this home commencing in 1910 and continuing until at least 1964. 
There was reference in the Trial Court's findings that William Rolfe 
worked for Silver King Coalition Mines and was permitted to 
construct a house on the property (R. p. 380). The Trial Court 
refused to amend this finding but it was clearly erroneous. Mr. Rolfe 
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commenced living in the home in 1910 and Silver King Coalition 
received no alleged conveyance to this property until 1926 or 1927 
(1926 deeds from Withey to Silver King). Merle Anderson further 
testified that neither her father nor grandfather ever worked for 
Silver King Coalition Mines (T. p. 44). The only witness called by the 
Defendants (Mr. Osika) had absolutely no knowledge if either of the 
Rolfes ever worked for the mining company or used the home with 
permission (T. pp. 174-177). The Plaintiffs and their families who, 
believing they owned it, paid all taxes on the property (of which they 
were aware), raised two generations of their family, and have 
asserted ownership since 1910, including being responsible to Park 
City to repair the house (Addendum 8, pp. 52-60 of Trial Transcript). 
As reflected in the 1917 Deed from Summit County to William 
Rolfe, the real estate taxes on this property were delinquent in 1909, 
prior to Mr. Rolfe's occupancy. He paid the delinquent taxes in 1917 
and received a tax deed. The Court of Appeals at page 3 of their 
Opinion found: 
"There was no evidence that anyone other 
that William Rolfe paid taxes on the property 
until 1931. From 1931 until 1953 the real 
property was assessed as part of Silver King 
Coalition Mines. From 1954 to 1969 real 
property taxes were assessed to and paid by 
United Park City Mines. 
The Court of Appeals has misapplied the Park West v. Avise, 
supra case, mistakenly adding another element to the applicable 
statute of limitation for adverse possession That new element 
appears to be that the taxes that are assessed and paid are not 
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delinquent. It appears that the Court of Appeals has confused the 
four year statute of limitation found in Section 78-12-5.1 (U.C.A. 
1953, amended 1987), that is, acquisition of "tax title" as opposed to 
meeting the requirements of the adverse possession statute, 78-12-7 
and 12, U.C.A. (1953), which only requires that taxes be paid. 
Under both the findings of the Trial Court and the Court of 
Appeals, between the years 1910 and 1931 William Rolfe was not 
the owner of this property and not legally obligated to pay real 
property taxes. Both Courts further found that the title by the tax 
deeds were ineffective, a fact Plaintiffs will concede for purposes of 
this argument. Therefore, the fact that the taxes were paid late is 
immaterial to the vesting of title since William Rolfe was in 
possession of the property and he unquestionably paid all taxes 
which were assessed between the years 1910 and 1931. The fact 
taxes may have been paid late does not obviate the fact that all taxes 
assessed and any penalties or interest due were in fact paid by Mr. 
Rolfe. Affleck v. Morgan, 12 U.2d 200, 364 P.2d 663 (1961). 
Payment of taxes on the improvements is persuasive of payment of 
taxes on the ground. Houghton v. Barton, 59 Utah 611, 165 P. 471 
(1917). 
If any taxes were assessed on the realty then they were paid 
by William Rolfe. If, as the Court of Appeals states, the taxes were 
assessed on improvements only, and Plaintiffs are relieved of their 
obligation to pay non-existent assessments (Park West Village v. 
Avise, 714 P.2d 1137 (Utah 1986); Royal Street Land Company v. 
Reeve, 739 P.2d 1104 (Utah, 1987)). Exclusive possession coupled 
with these tax payments satisfied the statutory scheme and vested 
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title in William Rolfe seven years after his continuous possession and 
payment of taxes commenced (1910-1917). 
III . 
Plaintiffs' "Root Of Title" Is More Than 40 
Years Old And Insulated From Challenge By 
The Utah Marketable Title Act, § 57-9-1 
Plaintiffs' grandfather, William Rolfe, received two or three 
deeds to the subject property. While the descriptions are somewhat 
incomplete, extrinsic evidence submitted at trial clearly shows that 
the Rolfe family owned, occupied and treated the property as their 
own commencing in 1910. The initial deed from Summit County in 
1914 (Addendum 1) by its terms was a conveyance used to transfer 
an interest in real estate as defined by Section 57-1-1 U.C.A. (1953) 
and in the statutory form of a quit-claim deed for the conveyance of 
land as specified in Section 57-1-13 U.C.A. (1953 as amended). In 
addition, Mr. Rolfe received another deed from Summit County 
similarly reciting that the deed was executed pursuant to a tax sale 
of the real estate. Because of the length of time since the deeds were 
executed, it was impossible to ascertain whether or not the second 
deed was to correct the first or as an additional conveyance, but 
either deed vested "color of title" in William Rolfe, Baker v. Goodwin, 
57 Utah 379, 194 P.2d 117 (1920). 
It is important to note that beyond the uncertainties in the 
actual language of these deeds, there was no evidence, nor was it 
ever questioned that the home and property was easily locatable as 
being the Rolfe home. The letter from the Summit County Treasurer 
dated May 16, 1957 clearly demonstrated that the Summit County 
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Treasurer knew the property in question since he researched the tax 
history (Addendum 5). 
Respondent had actual notice of Plaintiffs' claim of ownership 
by the recorded deeds and the Plaintiffs' continuous possession 
Falcenaro Enterprises v. Valley Investment Co., 16 Utah 2d 77, 395 
P.2d 915 (1974). 
Section 57-9-1 U.C.A. (1953 amended 1963) states: 
"Any person having the legal capacity to own 
land in this State, who has an unbroken chain 
of title of record to any interest in land for 40 
years or more, shall be deemed to have a 
marketable record title to such interest as 
defined in Section 57-9-8, subject only to the 
matters stated in Section 57-9-2" 
Since the Defendants' title depends on a conveyance or act 
which precedes the Rolfe's "root of title," said interest is void, Section 
57-9-3 U.C.A. (1953 amended 1963) and the Defendant does not 
otherwise fall within any exception provided in Section 57-9-2 U.C.A. 
(1953 amended 1963). 
None of the Defendants or their predecessors were ever in 
possession of this property prior to the commencement of 
construction in early 1980, while Plaintiffs were in actual possession 
with "color of title" since at least 1914, the date of the first deed. 
Examination of the Utah Marketable Title Act and the intent of that 
legislation is clearly expressed in Section 57-9-9 U.C.A. (1953 
amended 1963): 
"This act shall be liberally construed to effect 
the legislative purpose of simplifying and 
facilitating land title transactions by allowing 
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persons to rely on a record chain of title as 
described in Section 57-9-1 of this Act, 
subject only to such limitations as appear in 
Section 57-9-2 of this Act." 
The Plaintiff's title is protected from challenge after 70 years. 
IV. 
If Title Did Not Vest In The Plaintiffs, They 
Had A Prescriptive Right To Maintain Their 
House And Yard In Its Historical Location 
Plaintiffs continually used and lived at this property for over 
70 years, to the exclusion of the world. In the findings prepared by 
counsel for the Defendants, there was a finding that Silver King 
Coalition Mines had given Plaintiffs' predecessor the right to use the 
property and the impossibility of that permissive use has been 
discussed earlier. Silver King Coalition Mines did not exist at the 
time William Rolfe took possession of this property; he never worked 
for the Company (T. p. 44); and Silver King Coalition Mine never even 
acquired any claimed interest until 1926 (Ex. 30), and even then, the 
mining company deed lacked any specific legal description of the 
proper ty . 
Plaintiffs' family took possession of this home and yard in 1910 
(T. p. 40) and occupied the premises continually either in person or 
by their tenants until 1964 (T. p. 40, 44 and 64). Subsequent to that 
time they were recognized as the owners by Park City in its demand 
to them to repair the property in 1978 (T. pp. 54, Ex. 16) and were in 
the process of rebuilding the home from the late 70s into the 80s (T. 
pp. 53-56, Exs. 41, 42). During this 70 year period, no entity or other 
person ever claimed ownership or the right to possession of this 
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home (T. p. 45). This Court enunciated the requirements for hostile 
possession which satisfy the adverse possession or prescriptive use 
requirements in State Road Commission v. Cox, 29 Utah 2d 127, 506 
P.2d 54 (1973) citing Pioneer Investment & Trust Co. v. Board of 
Education, 35 Utah 1, 8, 99 P. 150, 151 (1909): 
"Whenever the possession is of such a 
character that ownership may be inferred 
therefrom, then the possession ordinarily may 
be presumed to be hostile to the rights of the 
true owner; that is, if a party placed 
permanent structures upon the land 
belonging to another, and uses the land and 
structures the same as an owner ordinarily 
uses land, then, in the absence of something 
showing a contrary intention, a claim of 
ownership may be inferred in favor of the 
party in possession . . ." 
If 70 years of open, notorious and unchallenged possession was 
not sufficient to vest title in Plaintiffs, it ripened into prescriptive 
use for the maintenance of the yard and house on this property after 
20 years (1930), Zollinger v. Frank, 110 Utah 514, 175 P.2d 714 
(1946). 
V. 
Park City Is Liable For Damages For 
Authorizing ing The Destruction 
Of Plaintiffs5 Home 
In August, 1981, Park City issued a demolition permit to Deer 
Valley Resort (Addendum 6) for the demolition of a building located 
at 900 Pacific Avenue. It also said "remove building as per photo/' 
The Plaintiff's home was located at 112 Pacific Avenue (T. p. 100-
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101). The photograph attached to the permit included six structures, 
including the Avise house (T. p. 95, Ex. 40). It is unknown if any of 
the home were at "900 Pacific Avenue", but Plaintiffs' home was 
eight blocks away. 
Park City issued the permit and contended, for demolition 
purposes, Deer Valley Resort owned the property (T. p. 103), despite 
the earlier letters from Park City to Mrs. Rolfe and their response 
saying they were rehabilitating the home (Exs. 16 and 17). The 
building was demolished between August 4, 1981 and September 7, 
1981 (T. p. 73). After this action was filed, Park City contended that 
Deer Valley never owned the property but, in fact, Park City had 
acquired the property through its deed in 1969 (T. p. 148, Ex. 33). 
This discrepancy was never addressed by Defendants in this action. 
As a result of the demolition permit, Plaintiffs' home was 
destroyed. Park City claimed they were not responsible because 
they thought Deer Valley owned the houses (T. p. 115) and needed to 
be destroyed because they were nuisances. In fact, these houses 
were in the path of the new highway to Deer Valley (T. p. 99). The 
address of the Rolfe home was 112 Pacific Avenue and the address of 
the Avise house was 106 Pacific Avenue. 
The Trial Court found that Plaintiffs' claim against the City was 
barred because they did not submit a timely claim. The Trial Court 
confused Park City's denial of the claim with the actual claim. The 
claim (Ex. 18) was submitted August 30, 1982, within one year of the 
date the destruction was discovered on September 7 (Labor Day), 
1980. In Finding of Fact No. 16, the Trial Court found the Notice of 
Claim was filed September 20, 1982. That date applies to Exhibit 19, 
27 
which is the denial of the claim from the Park City Attorney to 
Plaintiffs' counsel. 
Despite the filing of a timely claim, it was not a prerequisite to 
maintaining this action against Park City. In Wall v. Salt Lake City, 5 
Utah 593, 168 P.766 (1917) the issues of adverse possession and 
estoppel against a municipality were the primary relief sought. This 
Court stated at p. 722: 
"Appellant contends that plaintiff was not 
entitled to damages for the reason she neither 
alleged in her complaint nor proved at trial 
she had first presented a claim for damages . . 
Respondent contends that the statute 
referred to does not apply to cases of this 
kind where the principal relief sought is 
equitable and the damage prayed for is 
merely incidental." 
This ruling upheld the determination that filing a claim was not 
required." 
In addition to dismissing Plaintiffs' claim for damages, the Trial 
Court found the damages were not proven. The unrefuted testimony 
of the Plaintiff, Merle Anderson which was admitted without 
objection, was that replacement cost of the home would be more than 
$20,000.00 (T. p. 63). Besides being one of the owners, Mrs. 
Anderson and her husband have remodeled "a number of houses" (T. 
p.63) and were actively engaged in property management and 
rehabilitation. 
The Court of Appeals in Ault v. Devoy, 739 P.2d 1117, 1120 
(Utah App. 1987) held: 
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"When damages to realty may be measured 
either by diminution in value or by the cost of 
restoration, and the plaintiffs give evidence 
only as to one, it is up to the defendants to 
show the other measure of damages would be 
less." 
Plaintiffs met their burden of proof and the failure of the 
Defendant to either object to the testimony or put on evidence in 
contradiction demonstrated the proper measure of damages suffered 
by the Plaintiffs was not less than $20,000.00. Obviously, it was 
difficult to ascertain the value of the structure since the home was 
destroyed and no appraisal was available, but that situation was 
created solely by the surreptitious destruction of the home. 
CONCLUSION 
This action is almost identical to Park West Village v. Avise, 
714 P.2d 1137 (Utah 1986), excluding the enforceability of the 
option question presented in the former case. Not only are the Avise 
deeds practically identical to those found in the Rolfe title 
(Addendum 1-5), the properties are located adjacent to each other in 
Park City. In fact, the Avise house was also listed in the demolition 
permit to be torn down by Park City. In the Avise case there is no 
proof of taxes paid prior to 1975 and the Court established that title 
had vested by that time. In this instance, all taxes assessed were 
paid by William Rolfe for at least the years 1910 to 1931, some 21 
years. The property had been sold and transferred to Summit 
County by an auditor's deed in 1909 prior to his occupancy and none 
of the Defendants' predecessors, who were the "owners", made any 
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efforts to pay the taxes during that time. Mr. Rolfe was not obligated 
to pay them. He was either a purchaser or adverse possessor. 
The Rolfe family grew up in this house for over 70 years. The 
finding that their occupancy was consensual cannot stand scrutiny. 
The only evidence of consent was a vague assertion that Silver King 
Coalition Mine had given some miners rights to live on their 
property. This Company doesn't even claim rights to the property 
until 1926. 
Equity and fairness are the reason our legislature provided 
limitations on actions to challenge title to people's homes. After 70 
years of undisturbed possession, certainly those restrictions were 
meant to insulate Plaintiffs from the stale claims of Defendants. Title 
should be quieted to the Plaintiffs. 




1914 Tax Deed to William Rolfe 
1917 Tax Deed to William Rolfe 
1957 Letter from County Treasurer 
1963 Tax Deed to Charles Rolfe 
1972 Abatement Letter 
Demolition Permit 
Court of Appeals Opinion 
Transcript of Merle Anderson 
Page 61 of Transcript RE: Claim 
EHT7.Y HO. 27644. QUIT CLAIM DEED 
quit-claims 
Bum of Twenty-
 w f , . 
fcark City, Sumrait County, Utah, to-wit: 
Improvements East U. C. Traces, Park City, Utah, j-J 
This deed is made from title secured from a certain tax sale in the your ij£ 
and "by an auditors deed to Summit County, dated May 1st, 1914 and inaccordance wilt 
Section H6o5, compiled laws of Utah, 1907, 
WITNESS tne hand of said grantors, by its duly authorized clerk, this 1-;^  
of June, A.D. iyi4. 
SUI.2IIT COVUTY 
(S32AL) 
By Moses C» Taylor Clerk. 
STATE OP UTAH ) r-yr .^ / A 
: ss. laATa IU 1J ^ 
COUUTY OP SUI.1IIT ) 
On this 10th day of June, A. D. 1914, personally appeared before me, Il08w4 
C. Taylor, who being by me duly sworn, did say that he is the County Clerk of Suaii; 
County, a municipal corporation of theState of Utah, tnat he executea the foregou^ 1 
trunent in behalf of said Summit County and in accordance with a resolution of tne 
Board op County Commissioners passed on the 3rd day of June, A. D. 1914, and said 
Moses C. Taylor, duly acknowledged to me That he executed the same. 
(SEAL) E. W. Par nsworth 
County Recorder. 
ooo 
Tnhnartn r.Tav rilst. 191V, at y O'oiocic A. It. 
r» 
EIIT&Y I!0. 27710. QUIT CLAIM DEED 
SUMMIT COUIITY, a municipal corporation, grantor of the state of Utah, £•:«».™ 
quit-olaims to T/illiam Rolfe, Grantee of Park City, Summit County, State of UtLi. :./E0 
the sum of One and no/100 (1.00) Dollars, the following described property situ^ul*i» 
Park City, Summit County, State of Utah, to-wit: * r^ 
j 'j» i 
That oertain frame dwelling house by Lumber Yard in Park City, Summit C::.;;:* 
Utah, assessed to William Rolfe in the year 1912. ** *" 
This deed is made under authority of Section 2665 compiled laws of Uuh, :•?.«, 
as amended by Chapters 114 & 116, Laws of Utah.1911 and in pursuanoe of an order 
of the Board of County Commissioners of said County made on the 5th day of June 
A, 1). 1917. " ' 
WITNESS the hand of said grantor, by its duly authorized Clerk, this 
21st day of June, A. D. -1917. 
SU. 1IIT COUHTY 
Ey A. C. Hortin . County Clen:, 
STATE OP UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUIITY OP SUUIIT ) 
On this ;<21st-day of June, A. D. 1917, A. C. Hortitf, personally appeared 
before me and being duly sworn, did say that he is the Cdmnty Clerk of Summit Cou^ ;, 
a municipal corporation of the State of Utah, and that he executed the fore^ oir.-r 
instrument in behalf of said County by* authority of a resolution of the Board oi 
County Commissioners o| said County, passed on the 5th day of June, A, D. TJ17, *&: 
said A. C, Hortin acknowledged to me that he executed the same. 
(SEAL) Kate 7/. Kimball 
County. xteoorder. 
0 0 0 
May 16, JWY r« 
Mr Charles *olfe 
Oakley, Utah 
Dear Mr *k>lfet 
I checked over the rectirds on the tax situation 4f youre 
fathers place in Park city, and Found that in 193S a quit 
claim deed was issued by the county to youre father for $33*00 
^e receipt and everything was made out to William Rolfe Sr. j> 
So I h^ve no way of knowing who paid that money. j 
From 1940 until 1954 the taxes were taken care bf by 
widows abatementf by the county commissioners. In the year 
1955 you paid the taxes of $S;06 and in 1956 you paid the taxes^ 
in the amount of 7^33 • 
I hape this is the information that you want, but if I 









Summit County Treasurer. 
•fXfHBff-S-
•
 W I » W I' I I ' ' W H I I " • W T ' I W I I l — l " HI »»*•»-
itry No. 97001 
TAX DEED * 
SUMMIT COUNTY, a body corporate and politic of the state of Utah, Grantor, hereby 
anveys to Charles Rolfe Grantee, of Oakley, Utah the following described .real estate in £ 
JMMIT COUNTY, UTAH: •[ 5 
House in lumber yand |^  
This conveyance is made in consideration of payment by the Grantee of the sum of $12,1 
olinquent taxes, penalties, interest and costs, constituting, a charge against said real 
state, which was sold to said County at preliminary sale for non-payment of general taxes 
.ssessed against it for the year. 195o in the sura of $7.8l. 
DATED this 13th day of June.1963. 
SEAL) (Seal) SUMMIT COUNTY 
By i. 
Reed P. Pace, County Auditor. 
# * * # i't * 
Recorded a t the request of County Clerk June 19 A.O. 1963 at 1:21 P.M. L 
V/anda Y. Spriggs , County Recorder 
9 
Entry No. 97003 * Revenue Stamps $3.8$ (Cancelle< 
Dr. Dan Oniki and K. Helen Oniki, his wife Grantors, of Salt Lake City, County of Sa 
Lako,. State of Utah, hereby QUIT-CLAIMS to Pete Robert Toly and Mary Lou W. Toly, his wif 
as joint tenants with the right of survivorship and not as tenants in common, Grantees of 
JPark City, Utah for the sum of Ton Dollars and other good and valuable consideration, the 
'ollowing described tract of land in Summit County, State of Utah: 
a-ft* w«* . i ft, ftpd 9 ?.n Block 28 of Snyders 
C O M M I S S I O N E R S 
C A A L O * L. pomrum 
KOY O. M O I 
O. MfUVIN FLINGf * • 
* • - » • -
Summit County 
State of Utah 
COALVILLE. U T A H 
... -_, .8401T : - -~" \~rj(*n*-\ • 
Aug. 31, 1972 





WAMDA Y. t»» IO«t 
ALAM O. rHANOtfN 
L IO O. r » * i i t » 




This is to advise you that your application for abatement 
of taxes for 1972 has been approved by the County Commissioners 




Reed D. Pace 







ft Humi—frUao of Structure* 
:••:--» J 
*eida. 
<rAc, eat Certificate No* 
Q Rough I 
BUILDING FEE SCHEDULE 
[Squen>Ft; of Butting ^/Veluaooo 
- I Garage so* ft. 
/fe3<?y i ? . ^ _ / / i <rz, / 
| ] Rnish Beeement-
Carport sq. ft. i W ^ 
Building Fees 




•Property Location _ 
£XL 
•Total Property Area • kv Acres, o* So.-Ft. 
•Owner 
f""| *rf metes end bound* 1 
mstruc&one 
^ "INaofBldgs. 
N a of Stories 
Tot * Bidg> Site. Aree»Used-
N a o f 
Bedrooms 
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This permit becomes nulTand void if work or construction authorized is r 
rnenced wfthln 180 days, or if construction or work is suspended or abandon 
period of 180 days at any time after work is commenced. I hereby certify th 
read and examined this application and know the same to be true and correc 
visions of laws and ordinances governing this type of work will be comp 
whether specified herein or not the* granting of a permit does not presum 
authority to violate or cancel the provisions of any other state or local law re 
construction or the performance of construction and that I make this s 
under penalty of perjury. 
Signature of Contractor or Authorized Agent 
it 
Signsture of Owner Iff owner) ""* »grn (Date) 
Census Tract. |X#*tf>c Zone Coordinate Went. 
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GREENWOOD, Judge: 
Appellants challenge the trial court's ruling that they 
did not have vested title to certain real property in Park City 
and thus were not entitled to recover damages for destruction 
of the home on the property. Appellants claim that they have 
title to the property through adverse possession, deeds or 
alternatively, that their use was prescriptive. Accordingly, 
they claim entitlement to $20,000 in damages for the 
destruction of the residence on the property. We affirm. 
FILED 
m r&tAO/* 1 
Ci^rkNih* Court 
Uteh Court o1 Appeals 
In August of 1981, Park City issued a demolition permit 
to Deer Valley Resort to remove a building. The building was 
demolished by Lloyd Brothers Construction Company between 
August 4 and September 7 of 1981 allegedly to build an access 
road Deer Valley Resort, Appellants brought this action 
seeking to quiet title to the real property and to recover 
damages for the destruction of the home located on the property. 
According to appellants, their grandfather, William 
Rolfe, possessed the home and yard on the property from 1910 
until his death in 1939. After his death, his wife continued 
to occupy the property until 1946. She died in about 1949. 
William Rolfefs son, Charles Rolfe, rented out the house from 
1949 until about 1964. Charles Rolfe died in 1966 and his 
wife, Ethel Rolfe, died in 1981. Charles Rolfe's daughters, 
appellants, claim to have visited the property at least once a 
year since 1964. In support of their claim that they have 
vested title to the property, appellants rely on the following 
documents: 
1. A quit claim deed from Dan and Belle McPolin to Jesse 
McCarrell dated March 19, 1906 for ••that certain one-story 
framed, three-room dwelling house situated on the easterly side 
of Silver Creek and about 100 feet easterly from the lumberyard 
of the Summit Lumber Company." 
2. A quit claim deed from Summit County to William Rolph 
[sic] dated June 10, 1914 for $28.68 for *[i]improvements East 
U.C. Tracks, Park City, Utah." The quit claim deed states that 
the deed is "made from title secured from a tax sale in the 
year 1909 and by an Auditors deed to Summit County, dated May 
1st, 1914." 
3. A quit claim deed from Summit County to William Rolfe 
dated June 21, 1917 for $1.00 for "that certain frame dwelling 
house by Lumber Yard in Park City, Summit County, Utah, 
assessed to William Rolfe in the year 1912." 
4. A letter from the Summit County Treasurer to Charles 
Rolfe dated May 16, 1957 stating that in 1938 the county issued 
a quit claim deed to Charles Rolfe*s father. The letter also 
stated that from 1940 to 1954, taxes were taken care of by 
widows abatement and that Charles Rolfe paid taxes of $8.06 in 
1955 and $7.33 in 1956. 
5. A tax deed from Summit County to Charles Rolfe dated 
June 13, 1963 for "House in lumber yard,- stating "It]his 
conveyance is made in consideration of payment by the Grantee 
of the sura of $12.53 delinquent taxes, penalties, interest and 
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costs, constituting a charge against said real estate for the 
year 1958 in the sum of $7.81.-
The State of Utah claims chain of title through a series 
of documents, all of which were recorded, and all, except 
numbers 3, 4 and 5 below, contained a metes and bounds 
description of the property. The documents are as follows: 
1. A patent from the United States government, 
undisputedly containing the property in question, to George 
Snyder on April 5, 1882. 
2. A deed from George Snyder to the Park City Smelting 
Company, dated November 14, 1883. 
3. A deed from the Park City Smelting Company to Lewis 
H. Withey and Clay H. Hollister on September 21, 1912. The 
deed did not contain a metes and bounds description, but 
described the conveyed property as "all of the real property or 
rights or interest in real property belonging to the Park City 
Smelting Company and situated in the County of Summit, Utah." 
4. A deed from the executors of Lewis H, Withey*s estate 
to Silver King Coalition Mines Company on November 5, 1926. 
The deed did not have a metes and bounds description, but 
conveyed "all the estate, right, title, interest, property, 
claim and demand whatsoever of the said Lewis H. Withey . . . 
[of] the property above described." 
5. A trusteed deed from Clay Hollister, Withey*s tenant 
in common, to Silver King Coalition Mines on February 18, 
1927. The deed did not contain a metes and bounds description 
but described the property as "all other real property or 
rights or interests in real property . . • belonging to Park 
City Smelting Company, and situated in the County of Summit, 
State of Utah." 
6. A deed from Silver King Coalition Mines Company to 
United Park City Mines Company, dated May 8, 1953. 
7. A deed from United Park City Mines Company to Park 
City, dated April 2, 1969. 
8. A deed from Park City to the State of Utah, dated 
June 7, 1982. 
£here was no evidence that anyone other than ^William 
Jto3fe paid taxes on the property until 1931. From 1931 to 
1953, the real property in question was assessed as part of 
Silver King Coalition Mines Company. From 1954 to 1969, real 
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property taxes were assessed to and paid by United Park City 
Mines, 
The trial court found that appellants1 chain of title was 
discontinuous and, at best/ conveyed title to improvements on 
the property only. The court concluded that the State#s claim 
to title of the property was superior to that of appellants 
and, therefore, quieted title in the State of Utah and 
dismissed appellants1 complaint. 
On appeal, appellants assert that: 1) the trial court 
erred in finding that they did not have vested title to the 
property by deed or adverse possession; 2) even if appellants 
do not have title to the property, they established 
prescriptive use; 3) respondents are barred from challenging 
appellants1 tax title by the statute of limitations set forth 
in Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-5.1 (1987); and 4) respondents1 
claims are barred by laches and estoppel. 
Vested Title 
Appellants first claim on appeal that the trial court 
erred in concluding they did not have vested title to the 
property by deed. Appellants assert they obtained tax title to 
the property by virtue of the 1914 quit claim deed and the 1963 
tax deed from Summit County, and any action challenging that 
title is barred by the four year statute of limitations set 
forth in Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-5.1 .(1987). In addition, they 
claim title under the Marketable Record Title Act, Utah Code 
Ann. § 57-9-1 through -10 (1986), commencing with the 1917 quit 
claim deed as the ••root" of title. The trial court concluded 
that the tax deeds under which appellants claimed title did not 
convey title to the underlying real property. 
In reviewing the trial court's conclusions of law, we 
apply a correction of error standard with no deference to the 
trial court. Creer v. Vallev Bank and Trust Co., 97 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 12, 12 (Dec. 9, 1988). A person who has a duty to pay 
taxes cannot fail to pay taxes and subsequently purchase the 
land at a tax sale and thereby attempt to strengthen his title 
to the property. Dillman v. Foster, 656 P.2d 974, 979 (Utah 
1982); Crofts v. Johnson, 6 Utah 2d 350, 313 P.2d 808, 810 
(1957). In addition, one who has a tax deed but does not hold 
title to the property cannot assert the special statute of 
limitations contained in Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-5.1 (1987). 
Dillman, 656 P.2d at 978-79. 
In this case, there is no indication that William Rolfe 
was the record titleholder. Even assuming he received quit 
claim deeds from Summit County in 1914, 1917 and 1957 after 
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paying delinquent taxes, we agree with the trial court that, at 
most, he received title to the improvements described in the 
deeds. The 1963 tax deed, similarly, conveyed only the 
improvements, not the underlying real property. Taxes at that 
time were apparently separately assessed on improvements and 
real property in Summit County, and the Statefs predecessor in 
title, United Park City Mines, paid real property taxes from 
1954 to 1969. The deeds did not strengthen Rolfefs title to 
the property, but merely indicated that he paid delinquent 
taxes on the property. The Statefs title, on the other hand, 
tfhile flawed, is clearly superior to that of appellants. 
Therefore, we hold that the trial court did not err in 
concluding that appellants failed to establish title to the 
property by deed and that the tax deed statute of limitations 
was inapplicable. 
Adverse Possession 
Appellants' second assertion of error is that the trial 
court erred in finding that appellants did not have title to 
the property by adverse possession. The proponent of an 
adverse possession claim has the burden of proving full 
statutory compliance, including the payment of all taxes levied 
and assessed. Neelev v. Kelsch. 600 P.2d 979, 982 (Utah 
1979). However, if a party in possession of property and his 
predecessors have paid taxes based on the value of improvements 
on the property and no taxes have been levied based on the 
valuation of the land, the party has established title to the 
property by adverse possession if all other elements of adverse 
possession are met. Park West Village, Inc. v. Avise. 714 P.2d 
1137, 1140-41 (Utah 1986); £££ alS£L Roval Street Land Co. v. 
E£££, 739 P.2d 1104, 1106 (Utah 1987). 
In Avise, the triai court found that Mrs. Lake failed to 
acquire title to property because she failed to pay taxes on 
the property. The Utah Supreme Court reversed, stating that 
the trial courtfs finding that Mrs. Lake failed to pay taxes on 
the property was contrary to the evidence. The court noted 
that an employee of the Summit County assessor's office 
testified at trial that he had searched the records in that 
office and could find no evidence that any taxes had been 
assessed on the land prior to 1975. The undisputed evidence 
established that Mrs. Lake received a tax notice every year and 
paid the tax that was levied. Although those taxes were based 
only on the value of the improvements on the property, the Utah 
Supreme Court held that because no other taxes were levied, 
Mrs. Lake had "paid all taxes levied and assessed" in 
accordance with Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-12 (1977). The court 
also noted that there was no evidence that there were any 
delinquent taxes owing on the land for the years prior to 1975 
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or that the land had been sold by the County for failure to pay 
taxes for those years. 
Appellants claim that this case is indistinguishable from 
Avise. We disagree. In Avise, unlike this case# Mrs. Lake 
established that she had paid taxes on the improvements to the 
property for twenty-three years. In this case# however, the 
only evidence that appellants' predecessors had paid taxes on 
the property for seven continuous years were quit claim and tax 
deeds and a letter from Reed Pace to Charles Rolfe. There was 
no evidence that taxes were paid prior to delinquency. At 
best/ the deeds and letter indicate that William Rolfe paid 
delinquent taxes on the personal property at various tax 
sales. Further, appellants established that Charles Rolfe paid 
taxes on improvements on the property in 1955
 # 1956 and 1958, 
but it was also proven that real property taxes were paid by 
Silver King Coalition Mines Company those same years. Thus# 
unlike Avise, appellants failed to prove that they paid taxes 
on the home or on the underlying land for a continuous seven 
year period. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-7.1 (1987) • Payment 
of delinquent taxes at a tax sale cannot be used to establish 
the payment of taxes necessary to a successful claim of adverse 
possession. Otherwise/ anyone purchasing property at a tax 
sale would be able to claim the number of years taxes had gone 
unpaid as a credit on the seven year period required for 
adverse possession. In addition/ in contrast to fivise. the 
quit claim deeds themselves establish that taxes were assessed 
and not paid during the years appellants claim to have 
established title by adverse possession. Therefore/ we hold 
that appellants failed to sustain their burden of proving 
payment of taxes for the requisite seven year period/ and the 
trial court correctly concluded that appellants did not acquire 
the property by adverse possession. 
Prescriptive Easement 
Appellants also assert that even if they do not have fee 
title to the property by adverse possession or chain of title/ 
they have a prescriptive easement. Appellants are unclear as 
to what they claim flows from the alleged prescriptive 
easement. If they claim that a prescriptive easement/ if 
established, would give them ownership rights in the underlying 
property/ they err. £££ Osborn & Cavwood Ditch Co. v. Green, 
673 P.2d 380/ 382 (Colo. Ct. App. 1983). A prescriptive 
easement does not result in ownership/ but allows only use of 
property belonging to another for a limited purpose. North 
pnion Canal Co. v. Newell, 550 P.2d 178/ 179 (Utah 1976). A 
prescriptive easement "arises under our common law from a use 
880131-CA 6 
of the servient estate that is fopen, notorious, adverse, and 
continuous for a period of 20 years.'• Crane v. Crane, 683 
P.2d 1062, 1064 (Utah 1984) (quoting Jensen v. Brown, 639 P.2d 
150, 152 (Utah 1981))• The trial court concluded that 
appellants had not established a prescriptive easement*1 A 
claimant of prescriptive easement must establish the necessary 
elements by clear and convincing evidence* Garmond v. Kinney, 
91 N.M. 646, 579 P.2d 178, 178 (1978). Appellants not only had 
the burden of proof at trial, but on appeal are similarly 
required to marshall all evidence supporting the trial court's 
findings and then to demonstrate that the evidence, when viewed 
roost favorably to the trial court, is insufficient. Scharf v. 
BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985). Appellants have 
not marshalled the evidence supporting the trial court's 
findings in connection with the issue of prescriptive 
easement. It further follows that on appeal, appellants are 
required to marshall evidence which would support each element 
required to prove their claim of prescriptive easement. For 
example, the trial court found that appellants' predecessors in 
interest worked for Silver King Coalition Mines Company, and 
were given permission by the company to build a house on the 
property in question. Appellants claim that this finding is 
not supported by the evidence but they do not provide, other 
argument or reference to the trial record to establish that the 
use was "adverse,* one of the required elements for 
prescriptive easement. Similarly, appellants have not compiled 
evidence which establishes the other necessary elements and 
have further failed to analyze what rights or claims to damages 
might flow from the alleged prescriptive easement. We will not 
consider conclusory arguments without citation to either the 
record or cases involving pivotal issues. Randall v. Salvation 
Armv, 100 Nev. 466, 686 P.2d 241, 244 (1984). Therefore, we 
find that appellants did not establish a prescriptive easement 
to the property. 
Laches and Estoppel 
Finally, appellants assert that Park City is barred from 
claiming ownership of the property by laches and estoppel. 
Those issues were not raised in the trial court and, therefore, 
1. The court also concluded that the prescriptive easement 
claim was barred by Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-5 (1987). However, 
in Morris v. Blunt. 49 Utah 243, 161 P. 1127 (1916), the Utah 
Supreme Court held that the predecessor section to the present 
code does not apply to actions for prescriptive easements. 
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we decline to reach them. See James v. Preston, 746 P.2d 799, 
801 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
Affirmed. 
^^CsC 7T *<£ (P 
Pamela T. Greenwood/ Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
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% A We got a letter from — What was his name? 
2 I Q Let me back up for a minute and see if I can 
4 I help you with this. This is Plaintiffs1 Exhibit 16. Can 
5 I you identify this? 
6 I A This is a letter I v/rote back to Robert Scanter 
7 | telling him to --
3 I Q Is it dated? 
9 I A It is dated 1978. 
10 I Q And it is signed by you? 
11 I A Yes. 
12 I Q And written by you? 
A Uh-huh (yes). 
Q And at the top there is "copy" written on that? 
15 | A Uh-huh (yes). 
16 I Q Is this a copy of the letter you wrote him? 
17 I A This is a copy of the letter I wrote to him. 
18 I MR. FELTON: We would move admission of Exhibit 16, 
19 I Your Honor. 
20 I MR. SMITH: No objection, Your Honor. 
21 I MR. EACKMAN: None. 
22 J THE COURT: 16-P is received. 
23 J Q (By Mr. Felton) This letter is dated May 5, 
24 I 1978. Merl, it appears to be a response. 
































Who did the letter 









Do you have a copy 
I can't remember. 
Whether we lost itf I 
Let me show you --
Yes. 
identify Mr. Scanter as? 
wrote to us from the Park 
of his letter? Do you know? 
It seems like we did have a 
think we did. 
is this what you mean? 
This is the other letter? 
Uh-huh (yes). 
Q This i s Exhibi t 17, the date appearing on tha t 
i s April of '79? 
A Yes. 
Q This is '78. You have any other letters? 
A I think the one from this one we probably lost 
track of. 
Q Can you recall what the letter was about? 
A I think he just told us that the property needed 
to be fixed up or we had to do something. They were going 
to try to clean up Park City, so we were going to try to 
clean it up, too. 
Q And that was the purpose of this letter? 
A Yes. 
Q And what was the reason you wrote this letter? 
A Told him not to tear it down, we wanted to take 
^ 
care of it, 
Q Let me show you what has been marked Plaintiffs1 
Exhibit 17 and ask you if you can identify that letter? 
A This is another letter from Scanter. It came to 
mother. 
Q There is some writing on the back of this exhibit. 
Do you know who wrote that? 
A I am sure I must have written this on here. This 
letter v/as sent to mother, Ethel Rolfe, in Oakley, Utah. 
Q And where did you find this letter? 
A In the documents. 
Q Did you reply to this letter? 
A I donft remember whether I did or not. 
MR. FELTON: We would move admission of Plaintiffs1 
Exhibit 17, Your Honor. 
MR, SMITH: We are going to object on foundation, 
Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Why does it lack foundation? Who is 
it from? 
MR. FELTON: Mr. Scanter. 
THE COURT: Park City. 
MR. SMITH: It purports to be a letter from the 
City. I suppose we can object on hearsay. It is being 
admitted to prove something and the person is not here 
to identify he v/rote the letter, or wrote the letter or 
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1
 J signed the letter. 
2 I THE COURT: Objection is sustained. 
3
 I Q (By Mr. Felton) fieri, in late, early-late 70's, 
4
 ] or early 80's, v/ere you involved in this property a lot? 
5 I A Yes. We were the one -- my family was the one 
6
 | that was really working on it to get it fixed up. 
7 | Q I should have it marked. It wasn't marked, 
8 J I am sorry. And at that time were you also talking with 
9 I people about the property? People in Park City or people 
10 I other places? 
11 J A We tried to get -- we talked to Park City about 
12 I it, about getting the lights turned on. We went up there. 
-13 I We re-wired the house. 
14 I MR. SMITH: Your Honor, could I voir dire the 
15 I witness? 
16 I THE COURT: You may, 
17 I MR. SMITH: Could you tell me who you talked to 
18 J at Park City about the electricity? 
19 I THE WITNESS: Yes. 
20 I MR. SMITH: Could you please tell me? 
21 I THE WITNESS: I went right to the Utah Power and 
22 J Light office, I am sorry. 
23 J MR. SMITH: Thank you, Your Honor. That is the 
24 J point I am trying to bring out. Park City has never had 




 • THE WITNESS: That is right. 
2
 I MR. FELTON: I will object to that. 
3
 J THE COURT: That probably should have been 
brought out on cross examination. If you had an objection 
5
 J as to foundation, that is what it should have been. 
6
 | MR. SMITH: Mo objection, Your Honor. 
7
 | THE COURT: Sometimes we get those things mixed 
8 J up, but that testimony is in. 
9 | Q (By Mr. Felton) Merl, do you have a real fresh 
10 I recollection about everything you did at this time? 
11 I A No, if I hadn't written down a few things, I 
12 I wouldn't remember. It is hard to remember dates and all of 
13 J this. 
14 I Q Let me show you Plaintiffs' Exhibit 41 and ask 
15 I you if you can identify this? 
16 I A This is a little log I v/rote down, kind of keeping 
17 I track of times we went up to Park City. And sometimes I 
18 J wrote it down and sometimes I didn't. 
19 J Q As to the dates and the actions reflected on 
20 J that exhibit, were those made on or about the time identified^ 
21 I When I say --
22 J A Pretty much so. I tried to write it down then. 
23 I Q If you look at that, does that document refresh 
24 J your memory as to v/hy you wrote those down and the subject 
25 I matter of each of those recollections? 
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J A Yes, it kind of refreshes my memory. 
2 I 
I Q Would you read it, please? 
J A It says — 
4 I 
J Q You have got to start at the first, though. 
5
 I THE COURT: Let's take a recess. We have been 
6
 | going quite a v/hile and Dorothy needs a rest. Let's take 
7
 | a ten-minute recess at this time. 
8
 j (At 10:55 a.m. Court recessed until approximately 
9
 I 11:05 a.m.) 
10
 I THE COURT: Let the record shov; that the Court 
n
 I just had a conference with counsel in charabers and the 
12 J Court in regards to 14, Exhibit 14, has on further 
13 J consideration felt that it should reserve its ruling as 
14 I to whether or not 14 will be received, and the record 
15 I should now reflect that Exhibit 14-P is not received. 
16 J However, the Court has it under consideration. Okay, you 
17
 I may proceed. 
18
 I MR. FELTON: Thank you, Your Honor. 
19
 J Q (By Mr. Felton) Merl, would you read the notes 
20 J that you have previously identified? 
21 I A "1980, July: Val and Marvel went to Park City 
22 J to put in the floor in the front room." 
23 J Q Who are these people? 
24 I A Val is my oldest son and Marvel is my husband, 
25 I Marvel Anderson. 
1
 J Q To expedite this, if they are going somewhere 
2 I and doing something is that the property in question? 
3 I A That is the property we are talking about here, 
4
 I Q Go on. 
5 I A fl -- front room and roof."-
6 | "July 24: Val, Narvel and Vance.11 Val Anderson 
7 | is my eldest son, Marvel my husband and Vance Anderson my 
8 ] second son put on the rest of the roof. These are our 
9 J boys from California. These two eldest ones. 
10 I July 26: "We are up to Park City to see about 
11 I why they haven't turned on the electricity." 
12 I July 11: "Talked to Attorney Orton on Park City 
13 I property about getting the probate into mother's name. He 
14 I said to get back, to him. It would depend on how much the 
15 I property was worth." 
16 I "August 11: Went to Oakley and took mother to 
17 I Park City to see engineer, to see property, to have it 
18 I surveyed, talked to Jan's assistant." 
19 I August 15: "Called Steve Beker in Park City to 
20 I find out cost. Ke will call me back." 
21 J August 15: "Steve 3eker called Sean," that is 
22 J our son at home, "while we were gone to the temple. And 
23 I he said for us to call him back. I called but he had 
24 I left on an errand." 
25 I August 19: "Went to Park City to see about survey.1) 
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August 28: "Went to see Earold Styles about 
survey and also title company. Paid Styles $200 to 
start the survey. Also got back to the deed from Lawyer 
Christiansen." 
Monday, Labor Day, September 1st: "Went to Park 
City to put up new rigid pipe for electricity." 
Tuesday September 2nd: "Called Park City, Utah 
Power and Light, to have lights turned on." 
Q That was all 1980? 
A That was all in 1980. And now this is still 1980, 
August 5: "Went to Coalville, took mother, talked to 
Attorney Christiansen about probate." 
August 7: "Called Christiansen's office. He 
was not in." 
Q Is that Terry Christiansen you are rexerring 
to? 
A Here (indicating). 
Q The Assistant Summit County Attorney? 
A Yes. 
Q Go on. 
A August 11: "Placed a person-to-person call to 
Attorney Orton." 
And September 2nd: "Called Park City Kail in 
Park City. Also called inspector in Park City to have 
the pipe inspected." 
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August, 1982, "Called Mr. Felton, the attorney.11 
August, 1982, "Went to Park City. Someone had 
put a fence around the property, Rolfe property." 
And 1982, "Went to Salt Lake to see about a 
letter to the city about our house. They had torn it 
down." 
MR. FSLTON: Thank you. Your Honor, under the 
rules we are not capable of admitting this document, though 
the adverse party is. So, I will leave it there. We 
have read it. 
THE COURT: Under the rules you have two 
possibilities. You have a document that is used to refresh 
a witness's testimony, in which case it should not be 
read into evidence, but may only be used to refresh the 
witness's testimony and you must give the adverse party a 
chance to review that document, or it is a recorded 
recollection. It is something that was recorded at or 
near the time things were done and, in which case, the 
document is admitted and then you can have it read into 
evidence, I suppose. But it had no objections either 
way. Right now the testimony is in and the document just 
sits there and you aren't offering it because you can't 
under t h e rules? 
MR. FELTON: That is correct, Your Honor. I 
wanted to alert you as to the reason why we are not. 
i 
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Your Honor, there are a couple of items out 
of order here that we have reviewed. Plaintiffs1 Exhibit 18, 
which is a claim which I filed with Park City August 30th, 
dated August 30, 1982, and a response from Tim Clyde, 
Plaintiffs1 Exhibit 19 we would move admission of those 
two documents, Your Honor. 
MR. SMITH: No objection, Your Honor. I think 
we stipulated to those. 
THE COURT: Mr. Bachman? 
MR. BACHMAN: No objection, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: 18 and 19 are received. 
Q (3y Mr. Felton) Merl, in your conversations with 
Mr. Scanter or the other people that you have testified to 
in regards to your notes, did anyone ever assert or tell 
you that you didn't own the property or your family 
didn't? 
A No. 
Q Did anyone ever tell you that someone, other than 
you or your family owned the property? 
A No. 
Q Merl, has the use of the property historically 
gone on for as long as you have knowledge of it? As you 
described it, has that use been continuous? 
A It has been continuous, yes. 




914 TAXATION—COLLECTION OF TAXES. 
under any such assessment must be adjourned until the time of redempti«»:. 
under the previous sale shall have expired. 
Property bought by county to be sold at private sale, §§ 2G2G, 2C55. 
2652. Id. In case an assessment is made under the provisions of the ne.\ 
preceding section, and the lands are not redeemed from a previous sak\ 1I;K 
under § 2623 as provided by law, no sale must be had under the assessment au-
thorized by the next preceding section so long as the county holds the <-erti:' 
icate of sale, unless directed by the board. 
2653. Id. Redemption. In case property is sold to the county as pur-
chaser, pursuant to § 2623, and is subsequently assessed pursuant to £ 26f>i 
no person must be permitted to redeem from such sale, except upon payme::' 
also of the amount of such subsequent assessment, interest, and costs. 
2654. Distribution of money received for redemption. Whenever prop-
erty sold to the county pursuant to the provisions of this title is redeem' 
or the certificate of sale is assigned, as herein provided, the moneys receive: 
on account of such redemption or assignment must be distributed as follow* 
The original taxes and forty per cent of interest and costs received must t 
apportioned to the state, county, city, town, school district, and other taxii;-
districts interested, in the proportion of their respective taxes, and the balai1.*-
must be paid to the county. The county treasurer must keep an accurate i\ 
count of all the moneys paid in redemption of property sold to the county, a: 
for assignments of certificates of sale thereof, and must, on the first Monday • 
June in each year, make a detailed report, verified by his affidavit, of each v.-
count, year for year, to the state auditor, in such form as the state audit"-
may desire. Whenever the county receives from the county auditor any grai;' 
of property so sold for taxes, the same shall be recorded, at the request of tl;; 
county auditor, free of charge by the county recorder, and shall be immed'-
ately reported by the county auditor to the board of county commissioners. 
Delinquent taxes, etc., to be paid to boards of education as fast as collected, § 1937. 
2655. Real estate deed to county to be sold at auction. Whenever 
county has received a tax deed for any real estate sold for delinquent tax--
the board of county commissioners shall, during the month of May in <^ ' 
year, after giving the statutory notice, offer for sale at the front door of i; 
county courthouse, at the time specified in the notice, all such real prop*1 
not heretofore sold or redeemed ; provided, that in cases where the descript' 
of such real estate is so defective as to convey no title, such real estate s^! 
not be so offered. The county clerk is authorized to execute deeds there-
in the name of the county, and attested by his seal, vesting in the purely 
-alLp.l the title of the state, oLt n e j30irnty\_and-of. eacli city, town, school. 
other taxing districts interestecLJn the real estate so sold. The money ai * 
ing from such sale must be paid into the county treasury, and the tiva^1' 
must settle for the same as in the case of money received for redempti"11-
provided in the next preceding section. The board of county commi^i'"11, 
may, at any time after the period of redemption has expired and before _• 
property has been deeded to the county or sold as herein provided, perm-; 
redemption from any sale where the property has been sold to the county- '; 
in no case for a less sum than the tax, interest, and costs. All properly ' 
which there is no purchaser at the sale provided for in this section shall th''' 
after be disposed of on the day of the first regular meeting of the b<>ai'1' 
county commissioners in any month, at either public or private sale. a> : 
said board may determine, and the money received therefor shall be ai'P'^ 
tioned as in the manner of tax sale redemptions. Am'd '05, p. 85; '07. p-'' 
May be sold at private sale, § 2G2G. minimum sum to be re-reived for property/0 '^ 
Assessment and sale, § 2651. t a x s a l e a t a s u m c c l u a l t o l h e amoiim <- u 
„ , . . , ., . , . .
 c ., interest, and costs due at date of sale. - n County commissioners have the right to fix the nCvwood v. Co. Com'rs, IS U. 57; 53 V. >9 
852 STATE OFFICERS—AUDITOR. 
15. To direct and superintend the collection of all moneys due the stat» 
and institute suits in its name for all official delinquencies in relation to tl,. 
assessment, collection, and payment of the revenue, and airainst persons wh 
by any means have become possessed of public money or property, and hav 
failed to pay over or deliver the same, and against all debtors of the state: « 
which suits the courts of the county in which the seat of government may 1 
located have jurisdiction, without regard to the residence of the defendant* 
1G. To draw warrants on the state treasurer for the payment <">!' mouc; 
directed by law to be paid out of the treasury; but no warrant must be draw 
unless authorized by law. Every warrant must be drawn upon the fund out -
which it is payable, and specify the service for which it is drawn, and ti 
specific appropriation applicable to the payment thereof; 
17. To furnish the state treasurer on the last day of each month with 
list of warrants drawn upon the treasurer, specifying the amount and nun^-
of each warrant, and the name of the person in whose favor it is drawn; 
18. To procure and have printed all state licenses, and to sign the sa::. 
and furnish the state treasurer with licenses and charge him with the same: 
19. To authenticate with his official seal all drafts and warrants drav. 
by him and all copies of papers issued from his office: 
20. To collect and pay into the state treasury all fees received by him: 
21. To perform the duties of a member of all boards of which he is 
may be made a member by the constitution or laws of the state, and such oti • 
duties as are prescribed bv the constitution and bv law. 
Am'd '99. p. 10S; '05. p. 1" 
Salary $2,000 per annum. § 2049x. Fees of s ta te auditor . § 906. 
Mav appoint deputies, §§ 2427x3, 24G0. It is the duty of the state auditor to e x a m " 
Auditor is s ta te recorder of marks and brands . the accounts of s ta te and county otfirrrs •>'; 
§ 36; s ta te recorder of pedigrees of stock, $ 48 ; and satisfy himself tha t lawful fees are cull" i • < 
s ta te sealer of weights and measures, § 2725. ported, and paid. If fees are not paid a> ; 
„ , . .. *
 4. A i • V. . - m this chapter , it is the du tv of the audit • 
Election, qualifications, term, duties, Con. a r t . / .
 i n s t i t u t e p r o p e r proceedings for collection. 
Not to draw warran ts unless claim approved by State , ex rel. Richards v. Stanton, 14 I • Is1 ' 
board of examiners, exceptions, § 946. P . 1109. 
2421x. It shall be unlawful for the state auditor to audit or draw a >*• 
warrant in payment of any claim against the state for any money, nub— 
appropriation has been previously made for such purposes or unless aiith<»r 
by law. '07, p. 185. 
2422. (Repea l ed . Jf)i>? p . 110.) 
2423. School funds. The state auditor must keep a separate ac^;ii; 
the school fund, and of the interest and income thereof, together wii.' = 
moneys as may be raised by special tax or otherwise for school pnrp<'-,v 
he must, on the 31st day of March, and of December of each y^ir. r<T '! 
the superintendent of public instruction, a statement of the securities }';*' '' 
to the school fund, of the moneys in the treasury subject to appo''1-1"1 
and the several sources from which they accrue. He must draw his \^ 
on the state treasurer in favor of the treasurer of any county or of ;IN} 
of education, whenever such treasurer presents, with his endorsement ,)!! 
drawn bv the superintendent of public instruction in favor of such CDIUH.;
 ? 
A m ' d r!MM». ! 
School moneys to be paid over on war ran t of s ta te auditor , § 1863. 
2424. Warrants, order in which issued. All warrants for chum-
have been audited by the board of examiners and hied in his ol'ii«M' l l i ' 
drawn in the order of the numbers placed upon them by that board. 
2425. Actions for delinquent payments. Whenever any person 
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,vrd moneys, or has money or other personal property which belongs to the 
!(, |,y escheat or otherwise, or has been intrusted with the collection, manage-
l|t< <.r disbursement of any moneys, bonds, or interest accruing therefrom. 
„,Hiring to or held in trust by the state, and fails to render an account there-
/.,, .iixi make settlement with the state auditor within the time prescribed by 
„'. ,,!•. when no particular time is specified, fails to render such account and 
^, settlement, or who fails to pay into the state treasury any moneys be-
'.',',,jnir to the state, upon being required so to do by the state auditor, within 
, ,.nry days after such requisition, the state auditor must state an account 
'..j, sin-h person, charging twenty-five per cent damages, and interest at the 
*,. of ti'n per cent per annum from the time of failure; a copy of which ae-
'.,,,1 in any suit thereon shall be prima facie evidence of the things therein 
,,.,l: but in case the state auditor cannot, for want of information, state an 
...iinr. he may in any action brought by him aver the fact, and allege gen-
ii
 x- the amount of money or other property which is due to or which be-
. ,rs '<• the state. 
r-'i? failure of the county clerk to pay fees col- per cent ; nor is payment to the county treasurer a 
** i j,v him as provided by law after an account sufficient release. 
.',.,!! -rnted with him and demand made en- State , ex rel. Richards v. S tanton, 14 U. ISO; 40 
; ,"<;•• <f:ite to charge said clerk twenty-five P. 1109. 
!,.,.. . uimaires and interest a t the ra te of ten 
2426. Access to all state books. The state auditor shall have access to 
•; ,t;it(. offices during business hours for the inspection of such books, papers. 
. ,j nreounts thereof as may concern his duties. 
2427. Bond. The state auditor must execute an official bond in the sum 
.• sr>»H IOO. 
p:1l)lie school fund, Con. a r t . 10, sec. 3 . Annual levy of s ta te school t ax , § 259S. 
4 /? 
BUREAU OF^ STATISTICS. '// - '*s ~ 
2427x. Bureau created. State auditor ex officio commissioner. A statei s* 
•nvau <>f statistics is hereby created and established, and the said bureau shall! ^ ' ^ 
under the control of the state auditor. The state auditor shall be ex officio, 
:,,• eommissioner of said state bureau of statistics. '01. p. 47: ?07, p. 198 
2427x1. Duties of bureau. The duties of said bureau shall be to collect. 
-Mirt. systematize, and present in annual reports to the governor statistical 
;
-iails relating to agriculture, mining, manufactures, and other industries 
, die state; said reports to be published annually and distributed under th 
• ;iivction of the state board of examiners. ?01. p. 47. 
2427x2. Powers of commissioner. Witnesses. The commissioner of the 
uivati <>f statistics shall have power to issue subpoenas, administer oaths, and 
.ike testimony in all matters relating to the duties herein required by said 
•iireau. said testimony to be taken in some suitable place in the vicinity to 
•vhirh testimony is applicable. "Witnesses subpoenaed and testifying before 
'in* commissioner of the bureau shall be paid the same fees as witnesses before 
: justice's court, such payment to be made out of the contingent fund of the 
•urenu in advance, but such expense for witnesses shall not exceed $100 an-
nally. Any person duly subpoenaed under the provisions of this section, who 
diall wilfully neglect or refuse to attend or testify at the time and place named 
80-5-11 Title 80—Revenue and Taxation 
law for obtaining information from tax-
payers, assessor may penally assess the 
property; and must make notation on 
local roll opposite name of assessee); 
§ 460 (requiring assessor to estimate 
value of property, not listed by another 
person, where owner or claimant is ab-
sent or unknown). 
Iowa Code 1939, § 7112 (if any corpo-
ration or person refuses to furnish veri-
fied statements, state tax commission or 
assessor, as the case may be, must list 
and assess the property according to 
best information obtainable, and must 
add to taxable valuation 100 per cent 
thereof; the valuation and penalty must 
be separately shown, and shall constitnti 
the assessment). 
Mont. Rev. Codes, §2007 (simili*. 
" * * *and the value so fixed b y t f i 
assessor must not be reduced by thi 
board of county commissioners"), 
1. Assessor's estimate. 
Assessment of tax upon assessor's eon-
elusion that taxpayer was in "$100,000 
class," arrived at by assessor after ob-
servance of living habits and external 
appearances of taxpayer, was not au-
thorized under this section. F o x ? , 
Groesbeck, 63 U. 401, 226 P. 183. 
80-5-11. Id. Assessor to Report Information Gained to Other 
Counties. 
In case such affidavit or statement discloses property in any county 
other than that in which it is made, the assessor must file the affidavit or 
statement in his office, and transmit by mail a certified copy of ;thi 
same to the assessor of each county in which the property is shown tp 
be situated, who must assess the same as other taxable property within 
such county. (C. L. 17, §§ 5881, 5885.J, 
Comparable provisions. 
Mont. Rev. Codes, §2010 (similar). 
80-5-12. In Name of Owner, Mandatory, if Known—If Unknown. 
If the name of the owner or claimant of any property is knownlto 
the assessor, or if it appears of record in the office of the county re-
corder where the property is situated, the property must be assessed 
to such name; if unknown to the assessor, and if it does not appear 
of record as aforesaid, the property must be assessed to "unknown 
owners." (C. L, 17, §5884,) 
History. 
This section is much like 1 Comp. Laws 
1888, § 2012. It is practically identical 
with R. S. 1898, §2524; Comp. Laws 
1907, §2524. 
Comparable provisions. 
Cal. Rev. and Tax. Code, § 611, as 
amended by Laws of 1941 (similar). 
1. Duty of assessor. 
Under this section, assessor must 
avail himself of information furnished 
by public records, to ascertain name or 
names of the owners of taxable property 
in the county, otherwise listing name of 
owner as "unknown" will render tax 
sale void. Jungk v. Snyder, 28 U. 1, 8, 
78 P. 168, applying Revenue Act of 
1896. 
2. Life tenant and remainderman. 
A life tenant should be assessed as 
owner during the continuance of life 
estate. Sheppick v. Sheppick, 44 U. 131, 
136, 138 P, 1169. 
3. Joint owners and tenants in common. 
Formerly, at least, rule was that wbera 
realty was owned jointly, assessment 
to one of owners "et al." was erroneous. 
Asper v. Moon, 24 U. 241, 67 P. 409. 
Formerly, at least, rule was that wner* 
realty was owned by tenants in commWi 
delinquent list showing that realty WJ* 
owned by named one of tenants ^ c<JmI 
mon "et al." was insufficient. Aspe* 
v. Moon, 24 U. 241, 67 P. 409. 
4. Effect of erroneous assessment title Plaintiff in an action shows no 
by tax sale and deed where p t o P ^ 
was not assessed to defendant or i 
predecessor, the real owner, but ^^fffj 
sessed to one not the owner; ^erzjg«t 
a sale for taxes upon such an a s s e | s mry0 
and a deed in pursuance thereof n * j 
no binding effect as against the ***j 
owner. Salt Lake Inv. Co. v. Cjre 
Short Line R. Co., 46 U. 203, 217, 
Oregon 
2 , \ 
823, 38 S. Ct. 348. And see Jung*!'* 
r. lt  I . . •• j JF fS 
5 3> 2 1 T 7 , U 
P. 439, aff'd 246 U. S. 446, 62 I j - f £ 
Snyder, 28 U. 1, 78 P. 168. 
ant wno attempted to exciuae tne oiner coien-
ants after the purchase. Massey v. Prothero, 
664 P.2d 1176 (Utah 1983). 
—Former record titleholders. 
Where former record titleholders were obli-
gated to pay the 1964 taxes on the real prop-
erty but failed to do so and conveyed away all 
their interest and title in the property prior to 
the final or auditor's tax sale, and at such tax 
sale the former titleholders appeared and paid 
the delinquent taxes and purchased an audi-
tor's tax deed, the former titleholders, by meet-
ing their tax obligation at the tax sale, could 
not acquire any title or interest in the property 
beyond that which they already had, which 
baie, tnereiure, tne lurmer uuenoiaers couia 
not and did not purchase a tax title at the tax 
sale and were not entitled to the protection of 
the tax title statutes, §§ 78-12-5.1 to 78-12-5.3. 
Dillman v. Foster, 656 P.2d 974 (Utah 1982). 
Validity of section. 
This statute is a valid statute of limitations 
designed to validate tax titles. Although Laws 
1951, ch. 58 repealed parent statute of Laws 
1951, ch. 19, it did not repeal ch. 19. Under 
such circumstances it is not reasonable to as-
sume that the legislature intended to repeal 
Laws 1951, ch. 19. Hansen v. Morris, 3 Utah 2d 
310, 283 P.2d 884 (1955) (see Compiler's Notes, 
above). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Brigham Young Law Review. — Utah's 
Short Statutes of Limitation for Tax Titles: 
The Continuing Specter of Lyman v. National 
Mortgage Bond Corp. — A Need for Remedial 
Legislation, 1976 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 457. 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 51 Am. Jur. 2d Limitation 
of Actions § 84 et seq. 
C.J.S. — 53 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions 
§ 42. 
Key Numbers. — Limitation of Actions <s= 
19(7). 
78-12-5.2. Holder of tax title — Limitations of action or 
defense — Proviso, 
No action or defense for the recovery or possession of real property or to 
quiet title or determine the ownership thereof shall be commenced or inter-
posed against the holder of a tax title after the expiration of four years from 
the date of the sale, conveyance or transfer of such tax title to any county, or 
directly to any other purchase thereof at any public or private tax sale and 
after the expiration of one year from the date of this act. Provided, however, 
that this section shall not bar any action or defense by the owner of the legal 
title to such property where he or his predecessor has actually occupied or 
been in actual possession of such property within four years from the com-
mencement or interposition of such action or defense. And provided further, 
that this section shall not bar any defense by a city or town, to an action by 
the holder of a tax title, to the effect that such city or town holds a lien against 
such property which is equal or superior to the claim of the holder of such tax 
title. 
History: C. 1943,104-2-5.10, enacted by L. 
1951, ch. 19, § 2. 
"Date of this act". — The term "date of this 
act," referred to in the first section, means the 
effective date of Laws 1951, Chapter 19, i.e., 
May 8, 1951. 
Cross-References. — Marketable record ti-
tle, § 57-9-1 et seq. 
Occupying claimants, § 57-6-1 et seq. 
Tax sales, § 59-10-29 et seq. 
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niswry. ^ . i»03, 57-8-36, enacted by L. 
l975, ch. 173, § 19. 
Condominium Ownership Act. — See 
§ 57-8-1 and notes thereto. 
Meaning of "amendments". — The term 
"amendments," referred to throughout this sec-
tion, means those amendments made by 
1975, ch. 173, §§ 1 through 19, which now a] 
pear as §§ 57-8-3, 57-8-6, 57-8-7, 57-8-H 
57-8-13 through 57-8-14, 57-8-16.5, 57-8-11 
57-8-24, 57-8-27, 57-8-32.5, 57-8-35, 57-8-36 
CHAPTER 9 






What constitutes marketable record 
title. 
Rights and interests to which market-
able record title is subject. 
Marketable record title held free and 
clear of interests, claims and 
charges. 
Filing of notice of claim of interest au-
thorized — Effect of possession 









Notice of claim of interest — Contents 
— Filing for record. 
Applicability of provisions. 
Existing statutes of limitations and 
recording statutes not affected. 
Definitions. 
Legislative purpose and construction. 
Extension of limitation period. 
57-9-1. What constitutes marketable record title-
Any person having the legal capacity to own land in this state, who has an 
unbroken chain of title of record to any interest in land for forty years or 
more, shall be deemed to have a marketable record title to such interest as 
defined in § 57-9-8, subject only to the matters stated in § 57-9-2. A person 
shall be deemed to have such an unbroken chain of title when the official 
public records disclose a conveyance or other title transaction, of record not 
less than forty years at the time the marketability is to be determined, which 
said conveyance or other title transaction purports to create such interest, 
either in 
(1) the person claiming such interest or 
(2) some other person from whom, by one or more conveyances or other 
title transactions of record, such purported interest has become vested in 
the person claiming such interest: with nothing appearing of record, in 
either case, purporting to divest such claimant of such purported interest. 
History: L- 1963, ch. 109, § 1. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Adverse possession. 
Boundary by acquiescence. 
Adverse possession. 
City's continuous possession and use of canal 
for over ninety years and use of the land on 
both sides thereof in the maintenance of the 
canal, established title in such land by adverse 
possession; possession was hostile in that it 
was of such a character that ownership could 
be inferred therefrom; city acquired title de-
489 
LIMITATION 
cessively holding adversely in order to tack the 
possession of a predecessor in possession to 
that of his successor. Numerous cases hold that 
a deed does not in and of itself create any priv-
ity between grantor and grantee as to land not 
described in the deed, although occupied by the 
grantor in connection therewith, even if the 
grantee enters into possession of the adjoining 
area claimed to be held adversely by his 
grantor and the grantee uses such land in con-
nection with the land actually conveyed. Home 
Owners' Loan Corp. v. Dudley, 105 Utah 208, 
141 P.2d 160 (1943). 
Waiver or loss of right to plead statute. 
—Fraud. 
Where husband commenced action to have 
property which was held in wife's name re-
garded as being held in trust for him, while 
wife's divorce proceeding was pending against 
him, and spouses entered into agreement that 
Journal of Energy Law and Policy* — A 
primer of Utah Water Law, 5 J. Energy L. & 
Pol'y 165 (1984). 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 51 Am. Jur. 2d Limitation 
of Actions § 84 et seq. 
C.J.S. — 53 C.J.S. Limitation of Actions 
§ 34 et seq. 
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 2859; 
C.L. 1917, § 6449; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 
104-2-5; L. 1943, ch. 18, § 1; 1951, ch. 19, § 1. 
Compiler's Notes. — This section reflects 
the amendment by Laws 1951, ch. 19, § 1 to 
§ 104-2-5 (Code 1943). Although § 104-2-5 was 
repealed by Laws 1951, ch. 58, § 3, the Su-
preme Court held that Laws 1951, ch. 19 was 
not repealed. Laws 1951, ch. 58, § 1 enacted 
OF ACTIONS 78-12-5.1 
if husband would dismiss his suit to recover 
property, wife would dismiss her action for di-
vorce, and in pursuance of this agreement, hus-
band dismissed his suit but wife prosecuted her 
action to final decree, her conduct constituted 
palpable fraud and her plea of statute of limi-
tation could not prevail in subsequent suit by 
husband. Anderson v. Cercone, 54 Utah 345, 
180 P. 586 (1919). 
When action brought. 
—Action by minor. 
Action by minor within two years after he 
had attained majority, to recover real estate, 
was not barred although administrator was not 
discharged, since rule that heirs are barred 
where administrator is barred was inapplica-
ble, property being distributed to minor under 
§ 75-12-8 (since repealed). Robbins v. Duggins, 
61 Utah 542, 216 P. 232 (1923). 
A.L.R. — When does cause of action accrue, 
for purposes of statute of limitations, against 
action based upon encroachment of building or 
other structure upon land of another, 12 
A.L.R.3d 1265. 
Key Numbers. — Limitation of Actions «= 
19(1). 
the successor to § 104-2-5, now compiled as 
§ 78-12-5. See Notes to Decisions, below. 
The term "effective date of this amendment" 
referred to in this section, means the effective 
date of Laws 1951, Chapter 19, i.e., May 8, 
1951. 
Cross-References. — Marketable record ti-
tle, § 57-9-1 et seq. 
Occupying claimants, § 57-6-1 et seq. 
Tax sales, § 59-10-29 et seq. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
78-12-5.1. Seizure or possession within seven years — Pro-
viso — Tax title. 
No action for the recovery of real property or for the possession thereof shall 
be maintained, unless the plaintiff or his predecessor was seized or possessed 
of such property within seven years from the commencement of such action; 
provided, however, that with respect to actions or defenses brought or inter-
posed for the recovery or possession of or to quiet title or determine the owner-
ship of real property against the holder of a tax title to such property, no such 
action or defense shall be commenced or interposed more than four years after 
the date of the tax deed, conveyance, or transfer creating such tax title unless 
the person commencing or interposing such action or defense or his predeces-
sor has actually occupied or been in possession of such property within four 
years prior to the commencement or interposition of such action or defense or 
within one year from the effective date of this amendment. 
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Superiority of tax title. 
—Quitclaim deed. 
Quitclaim deed given to utility company's 
grantor which failed to show that the maker 
had any title to the land the deed purported to 
convey other than recital that such maker was 
the heir at law of the original owner did not 
convey title to the utility company's grantor 
and the utility company did not have any 
standing to challenge the title held by later 
purchaser of tax deed. State Rd. Comm'n v. 
Thompson, 17 Utah 2d 412, 413 P.2d 603 
(1966). 
Brigham Young Law Review. — Utah's 
Short Statutes of Limitation for Tax Titles: 
The Continuing Specter of Lyman v. National 
Mortgage Bond Corp. — A Need for Remedial 
Legislation, 1976 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 457. 
ANALYSIS 
Invalid tax title. 
'Tax title". 
—Failure to attach affidavit. 
Invalid tax title. 
Tax title holders may avail themselves of the 
special statute of limitations provided for tax 
titles regardless of either the invalidity of their 
tax title or their inability to establish an affir-
mative claim to title apart from their tax title. 
Frederiksen v. LaFleur, 632 P.2d 827 (Utah 
1981). 
Tolling of statute. 
—Previous quiet title action. 
Section 78-12-40 permitted defendants at-
tacking a tax title in a quiet title action to 
prove tolling of the statute of limitations 
where, within one year previous, an action in 
which a similar claim had been asserted by 
plaintiffs was dismissed not on the merits. 
Thomas v. Braffet's Heirs, 6 Utah 2d 57, 305 
P.2d 507 (1956). 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 72 Am. Jur. 2d State and 
Local Taxation § 1031 et seq. 
C.J.S. — 53 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions 
§ 42; 85 C.J.S. Taxation § 966 et seq. 
Key Numbers. — Limitation of Actions s=» 
19(7); Taxation «= 803. 
"Tax tide". 
—Failure to attach affidavit. 
Failure of county auditor to attach his affida-
vit to county assessment roll did not void audi-
tor's tax deed to county since term "tax title," 
as defined by this section, would indicate that 
Legislature intended to include within statutes 
of limitation tax titles which were initiated by 
tax sales the records of which would not show 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
78-12-5.3. Definitions of "tax title" and "action." 
(1) The term "tax title" as used in § 78-12-5.2 and § 59-2-1364, and the 
related amended §§ 78-12-5, 78-12-7, and 78-12-12, means any title to real 
property, whether valid or not, which has been derived through or is depen-
dent upon any sale, conveyance, or transfer of property in the course of a 
statutory proceeding for the liquidation of any tax levied against the property 
whereby the property is relieved from a tax lien. 
(2) The word "action" as used in these sections includes counterclaims and 
cross-complaints and all civil actions wherein affirmative relief is sought. 
History: C. 1943, 104-2-5.11, enacted by L. Retrospective Operation. — Laws 1987, 
1951, ch. 19, § 3; 1987, ch. 4, § 305. ch. 4, § 307 provides that this section has ret-
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend- rospective operation to January 1, 1987. 
ment, effective February 6, 1987, added the Cross-References. — Tax sales, § 59-10-29 
subsection designations and made a statutory
 e t seq. 
reference change. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
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8-12-7 JUDICIAL CODE 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 51 Am. Jur. 2d Limitation 
Actions § 84 et seq. 
C.J.S. — 53 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions 
34 et seq. 
A.L.R. — When does cause of action accrue, 
r purposes of statute of limitations, against 
action based upon encroachment of building or 
other structure upon land of another, 12 
A.L.R.3d 1265. 
Key Numbers. — Limitation of Actions «= 
18. 
8-12-7. Adverse possession — Possession presumed in 
owner. 
In every action for the recovery of real property, or the possession thereof, 
le person establishing a legal title to the property shall be presumed to have 
een possessed thereof within the time required by law; and the occupation of 
le property by any other person shall be deemed to have been under and in 
ibordination to the legal title, unless it appears that the property has been 
eld and possessed adversely to such legal title for seven years before the 
mimencement of the action. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943, 
upp., 104-12-7. 
Compiler's Notes. — This section is identi-
tl to former § 104-2-7 (Code 1943) which was 
•pealed by Laws 1951, ch. 58, § 3. Section 
)4-2-7 was also amended by Laws 1951, ch. 
), § 1; that provision is compiled as 
§ 78-12-7.1 herein. The Supreme Court held 
the amendment was valid despite the repeal of 
§ 104-2-7. See Notes to Decisions, below. 
Cross-References. — Marketable record ti-
tle, § 57-9-1 et seq. 
Occupying claimants, § 57-6-1 et seq. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
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dmission that third party owns land. 
dverse possession. 
pplicability of section. 
Dundary dispute. 
^tenants. 
delusiveness of statutory methods. 
ideral Government. 
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srmissive use. 
ural wife. 
•esumption of possession. 





dmission that third party owns land. 
In action to recover possession of certain real 
operty, defended on ground of adverse pos-
ssion, defendant's application to enter lands 
homestead held direct admission that legal 
,le to lands was in United States. Hanks v. 
se, 57 Utah 537, 1^5 P. 302 (1921). 
Adverse possession. 
Where grantor's use of water ditch on an-
other's land is permissive, his grantee's posses-
sion does not become adverse without claim of 
right. Yeager v. Woodruff, 17 Utah 361, 53 P. 
1045 (1898). 
Possession, which will create easement in 
another's land by analogy to statute of limita-
tions, must be hostile under a claim of right, 
242 
57-1-13 REAL ESTATE 
Covenant in deed restricting material to be nant controlling architectural style of build-
used in building construction, 41 A.L.R.3d ings to be erected on property, 47 A.L.R.3d 
1290. 1232. 
Validity and construction of restrictive cove- Key Numbers. — Deeds *=» 29. 
57-1-13. Form of quitclaim deed — Effect. 
Conveyances of land may also be substantially in the following form: 
QUITCLAIM DEED 
(here insert name), grantor, of (insert place 
of residence), hereby quitclaims to (insert name), grantee, of 
(here insert place of residence), for the sum of . 
dollars, the following described tract of land in 
County, Utah, to wit: (here describe the premises). 
Witness the hand of said grantor this day of , 
19 
Such deed when executed as required by law shall have the effect of a 
conveyance of all right, title, interest and estate of the grantor in and to the 
premises therein described and all rights, privileges and appurtenances there-
unto belonging, at the date of such conveyance. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 1982; 





Statutory and other forms. 
After-acquired title. 
Quitclaim deed operates to convey estate of 
grantor "at the date of such conveyance," and 
does not convey an after-acquired title. Duncan 
v. Hemmelwright, 112 Utah 262,186 P.2d 965 
(1947). 
An after-acquired title does not pass by a 
quitclaim deed. Dowse v. Kammerman, 122 
Utah 85, 246 P.2d 881 (1952). 
A quitclaim deed does not raise an estoppel 
as to an after-acquired title. Dowse v. 
Kammerman, 122 Utah 85, 246 P.2d 881 
(1952). 
Interest conveyed. 
Quitclaim deeds do not imply the conveyance 
of any particular interest in the property. 
Grantee acquires only interest of his grantor, 
"be that interest what it may." Nix v. Tooele 
County, 101 Utah 84, 118 P.2d 376 (1941). 
Statutory and other forms. 
Statutory form of quitclaim deed is permis-
sive only, and use of words "remise, release 
and quitclaim" in deed to mining claim passed 
all of grantor's title. Ruthraff v. Silver King W. 
Mining & Milling Co., 95 Utah 279, 80 P.2d 
338 (1938), distinguished, Adamson v. 
Brockbank, 112 Utah 52, 185 P.2d 264 (1947). 
Our statute requires no word of art to 
quitclaim. In construing whether an instru-
ment passes title, each case stands on its own 
words, combinations thereof, recitals, and 
other attendant facts, having in mind the rule 
that generally the instrument is construed m 
favor of the grantee. Meagher v. Uintah Cias 
Co., 123 Utah 123, 255 P.2d 989 (1953). 
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